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Abstract
Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic
competition model, where each one of two ﬁrms supplies two connected
market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, ﬁrms
are simply assumed to maximize proﬁts u b j e c tt ot w oc o n s t r a i n t s ,o n er e -
lated to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive
aggressiveness of each ﬁrm, measured by the relative implicit price of the
former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to
characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that
competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each ﬁrm through its manager
hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When compe-
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1tition is exogenously intensiﬁed, through higher product substitutability
or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competi-
tive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This
decrease partially compensates for the negative eﬀect on proﬁtability of
more intense competition.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized, both by practitioners and academics, that the en-
trepreneurial style of the manager crucially determines the performance of the
ﬁrm. Entrepreneurial style is related to a subtle combination of personality
traits and attitudes sustaining the leadership of the manager within the organi-
zation. However, from an external point of view, the entrepreneurial style of the
manager does also matter, although the underlying traits and attitudes can only
be assessed according to whether the ﬁrm is consumer- or competitor-centered
(Kotler, 2003). Indeed, customer orientation requires building conﬁdent rela-
tionships with the consumers, sticking with their needs, and developing nego-
tiation skills, whereas competitor orientation implies vigilance, responsiveness
and aggressiveness. Balancing these orientations is a strategic choice implying
human resource decisions based on the identiﬁcation of the portfolio of execu-
tives’ personal proﬁles and values which best ﬁt the desired orientation of the
ﬁrm. Competitive aggressiveness can consequently be viewed, not as a mere in-
dividual psychological characteristic of its members, but rather as a constructed
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Figure 1: Proactiveness in the entrepreneurial style scale of Covin and Slevin
in a ﬁrm’s willingness to take on and desire to dominate competitors through
a combination of proactive moves and innovative eﬀorts” (Covin and Covin,
1990, p.36). For a ﬁrm, competitive aggressiveness can be viewed as a chosen
characteristic. It may become a strategic variable. Our objective is accordingly
to analyze, in a simple oligopolistic model, the strategic choice of managerial
competitive aggressiveness.
If we look at the empirical literature, competitive aggressiveness is measured
by mixing items resorting to two dimensions:
(i)Atemporal dimension in terms of ﬁrst mover advantages (Lieberman and
Montgomery, 1988, 1998) and commitment to react to competitors’ moves. This
dimension refers to a proactive attitude of the manager who seeks to anticipate
the events and not to stay quietly in a procrastinated posture. It is quite explicit,
for instance, in the entrepreneurial style scale proposed by Covin and Slevin
(1988) on the basis of the questionnaire given in table 1. This dimension is
recognized as a key determinant of ﬁrm performance in hostile environments
3(Covin and Covin, 1990), or as a speciﬁc asset in entry deterrence strategies
(Clark and Montgomery, 1998a, 1998b).
(ii)Aspatial dimension associated with the quest of a market share advan-
tage. Venkatraman (1989), for instance, uses four indicators of aggressiveness
identifying various actions designed to gain market share at the expense of prof-
itability. This dimension measures the pugnacity of the manager, namely his
propensity to conceive his action within a “warfare context” (Kotler and Singh,
1981) where he has to decide either to launch a frontal attack on the rivals’
positions or to elude the struggle. As emphasized by Lumpkin and Dess (1996,
2001), the two (temporal and spatial) dimensions should be kept apart, and the
respective concepts of proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness carefully
distinguished: “proactiveness refers to how ﬁrms relate to market opportuni-
ties by seizing initiative in the marketplace; competitive aggressiveness refers
to how ﬁrms react to competitive trends and demands that already exist in the
marketplace” (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001, p.429). Without mobilizing dynamic
arguments and information structure considerations, competitive aggressiveness
identiﬁes a speciﬁc behavioral component of any ﬁr mf a c i n gac o m p e t i t i v ee n v i -
ronment, a component which can be represented along a metaphoric scale whose
extremes oppose hawkish and dovish attitudes.
The spatial dimension of competitive aggressiveness becomes particularly
signiﬁcant when the market for each ﬁrm products can be divided into a captive
segment and a contested segment, calling in principle for two distinct orienta-
tions, a customer orientation in the former against a competitor orientation in
4the latter. These orientations must however be balanced within a single compet-
itive posture whenever the ﬁrm is unable or reluctant to price discriminate, so
that the segments fail to fall completely apart. This posture, responding to the
trade-oﬀ between gaining new customers, in particular in the captive segment,
and picking up those of the rivals, reﬂects in practice the manager’s more or
less aggressive attitude.
In order to formalize the strategic choice of competitive aggressiveness, both
along its temporal and its spatial dimensions, we adapt the popular Hotelling
(1929) model of a spatial duopoly, where each ﬁrm has its own hinterland and
both compete actively in the middle segment between their locations. Of course,
as already pointed out by Hotelling, space is not necessarily geographic and may
account for product diﬀerentiation in terms of any characteristic which is rele-
vant from the consumers’ viewpoint. We assume that each ﬁrm keeps its hinter-
land captive by adopting a best price policy and thus making price undercutting
unproﬁtable for its rival, and also that it gives up any price discrimination by
introducing a most-favored-customer clause in its sales contracts.
A distinctive feature of our approach is that we suppose each ﬁrm to make
a price-quantity choice based on a feasibility analysis oriented towards both
consumers and competitors. It takes into account market feasibility (given the
consumers’ preferences and the anticipated decision taken simultaneously by its
rival) as well as competitive feasibility (the impact of its decision on its com-
parative price advantage). This approach, in terms of simultaneous price and
quantity decisions, has been introduced by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira
5and G´ erard-Varet (2007). It may be claimed to be more realistic than the stan-
dard dichotomic price or quantity formulations. At the business unit level of
a company, for instance, production and pricing decisions appear as aggregate
data. They are elaborated at diﬀerent stages of the organization through in-
terrelated decision processes which lead to a coordinated set of marketing and
logistic actions over a longer horizon. In this context, considering that these
decisions are made simultaneously is a reasonable point of view. Nobody can
imagine that a worldwide car maker like BMW or Renault might launch a new
car without letting know the (average) price and the global number of vehicles
he intends to sell per year.
This way of modeling oligopolistic competition has the advantage of gener-
ating a set of equilibria that can be parameterized by the degree of competitive
aggressiveness displayed by each one of the two competitors, the determination
of which immediately results in equilibrium selection. In this setting, the de-
grees of competitive aggressiveness can be either taken as exogenously given
or considered as strategic variables to be chosen at a previous stage. In the
latter case, such a choice refers to a human resource decision made at the top
management level, which might take the classical form of hiring the executive
in charge of the business unit. The hiring committee may then try to evaluate
the aggressiveness of the candidates on the basis of their previous experience,
personality traits and/or through indicators inspired, for instance, by Venka-
traman’s questionnaire (cf. table 1). It remains to the top management to
match this evaluation with the desired aggressiveness level required for the job.
6Another interpretation can be found in the management of the salesforce: the
aggressiveness factor is related to the proportion of time and eﬀort the sales
representatives have to devote to prospecting and attracting rival’s consumers.
This proportion is under the responsibility of the salesforce manager and reﬂects
the desired trade-oﬀ between customer and competitor orientations, expressing
how long the salesperson has to behave as a hawk or as a dove. Since the
competitors are both involved in the prior choice of their respective degrees of
aggressiveness, this leads to a two-stage game where the equilibrium pair of
degrees of aggressiveness determines the outcome. The question is to ﬁnd out
how aggressiveness competition confronts hawks, doves or some hybrid birds.
We introduce in section 2 the model of price-quantity competition, and char-
acterize the set of equilibria, showing that it includes the equilibrium outcomes
of several standard competition regimes, including Stackelberg equilibria. The
last point allows to link competitive aggressiveness to the temporal dimension
of the entrepreneurial orientation, and to exhibit the ﬁrst mover (dis)advantage.
In section 3, we analyze the strategic choice of managerial aggressiveness, and
discuss the implications of changes in the relative weight of the two market
segments. We conclude in section 4.
2 Price-quantity competition
We study a market where two ﬁrms compete to sell a homogeneous good, sup-
posed to be produced (or purchased) by both at the same constant unit cost. The
7product is diﬀerentiated by its location in space, as in Hotelling (1929). Here,
we assume that ﬁrm locations are ﬁxed and cannot be strategically changed,
and that ﬁrms compete simultaneously in both prices and quantities. This will
be formally represented by a non-cooperative game and the set of equilibria of
this game will be derived. Before, however, we need to describe the market, the
potential demand to both ﬁrms in this market and how sales are organized.
2.1 The market
Consider the Hotelling (1929) spatial duopoly where a continuum of consumers,
each likely to buy one unit of a homogenous good, is uniformly distributed on
the interval [0,1+2 a]. All consumers have the same valuation v of the good,
and bear a travel cost t per unit of length. Firm 1 is located at point a and
ﬁrm 2, symmetrically, at point 1 + a, so that they are separated by a distance
normalized to 1.
Sales contracts are assumed to incorporate two frequently used clauses. The
ﬁrst is a “most-favored-customer” clause by which all customers of each ﬁrm
should pay the same mill price. The second is a “best price guarantee” by which
the mill price Pi actually paid to ﬁrm i cannot be higher than either ﬁrm i listed
price pi or ﬁrm j delivered price pj + t at ﬁrm i location:
Pi (pi,p j)=m i n{pi,p j + t} (1)
With this second clause, the market on which each ﬁrm competes can be divided
into two segments, a captive segment [0,a]f o rﬁrm 1 (resp. [1 + a,1+2 a]f o r
ﬁrm 2) and a contested segment [a,1+a] (see Figure 2). According to the most-
8aa 1







Figure 2: The market segments
favored-customer clause, the listed price pi concerns both the captive and the
contested segments. As to the best price guarantee, it ensures that the captive
segment of each ﬁrm remains so whatever the prices chosen by the competitors.
Furthermore, each ﬁrm knows that its competitor will automatically adjust its
price so as to defend its captive segment. In other words, undercutting does not
pay.
Consider a pair of mill prices (p1,p 2) such that |p1 − p2| ≤ t. Then the
quantity demanded to ﬁrm i on its captive segment is xi =( v − pi)/t (see
Figure 2). Indeed, a captive consumer located at a distance xi from ﬁrm i must
pay the delivered price pi + txi which should not exceed his reservation price
v. On the contested segment the same applies, with the additional requirement
that the delivered price pi+tyi from ﬁrm i should not exceed the delivered price
pj +t(1 − yi)f r o mﬁrm j. Thus the quantity demanded on this segment to ﬁrm
i is









9When the prices (p1,p 2) violate the inequality |p1 − p2| ≤ t,t h eﬁrm setting
the lower price takes the whole contested segment over, while its rival matches
the delivered price according to the best price guarantee, managing to keep its
captive segment.
To simplify the analysis, by avoiding an excessive number of cases, we impose




<a .( 3 )
The inequality on the left implies that demand for ﬁrm i in the contested seg-
ment is yi =( t + pj − pi)/2t<(v − pi)/t.E v e n w h e n t h e t w o ﬁrms choose
the monopoly price v/2, the contested segment is covered, so that the two ﬁrms
actually compete for customers in this segment. As to the inequality on the
right, it implies that the quantity that a ﬁrm can and will sell in its captive
market is equal to demand xi =( v − pi)/t,f o rpi ≤ v. Even choosing a zero
price, each ﬁrm faces a demand smaller than its captive segment, so that the
aggregate demand x1 + x2 + 1 is always responsive to price changes.
By summing the demand on the captive and the contested segments, we
obtain the potential demand to ﬁrm i:













≡ Di(pi,p j). (4)
The potential aggregate demand is equal to
x1 + x2 +1=Di(pi,p j)+Dj(pj,p i)=D(p1,p 2)=
2v − (p1 + p2)
t
+1 . ( 5 )
102.2 The price-quantity game
In the price-quantity game,e a c hﬁrm i announces a selling order (pi,q i), express-
ing that it intends to sell the quantity qi at mill price pi,w i t h0≤ pi ≤ v and
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1+a. Out of this quantity qi, xi =( v − pi)/t is for its captive market
and yi = qi − xi is for the contested market. However, when ﬁxing its selling
order (pi,q i), while anticipating a competitor’s selling order (pj,q j), each ﬁrm
should perform a feasibility analysis. Two constraints have to be considered by
ﬁrm i.T h eﬁrst one, related to the potential demand addressing to it in partic-
ular, Di(pi,p j), is a competitiveness constraint reﬂecting its comparative price
advantage with respect to the competitor’s price (pj − pi), and with respect to
the customers’ reservation price (v − pi). The second constraint, related to the
potential aggregate demand, D(pi,p j), is a market feasibility constraint:t h e
selling orders must be compatible with the market size.
Assuming for simplicity a unit production cost normalized to zero, the proﬁt








qi ≤ Di(pi,p ∗
j)





j) is the anticipated selling order of its competitor. We thus get a
non-cooperative game, where the strategies of each ﬁrm are selling orders and





11(6) for each ﬁrm simultaneously forms a Nash equilibrium of this game.
Clearly, for each ﬁrm i, one of the two constraints should bind at equilibrium.
Also, the case q∗
i <D i(p∗
i,p ∗












j, are eliminated by
deﬁnition of D. Hence, at a Nash equilibrium, both constraints should bind for




2).1 If the equilibrium is
such that |p∗
1 − p∗
2| <t ,w i t ht h et w oﬁrms sharing the contested segment, then
each ﬁrm i maximizes its revenue facing a kinked demand curve (with the kink
in (p∗
i,q∗
i )) deﬁned by the two constraints of (6).
2.3 The set of equilibria
First let us observe that the inequality |p∗
1 − p∗
2| <tis indeed always satisﬁed
at equilibrium, both ﬁrms being active on the contested segment of the market.
This can equivalently be expressed in the following lemma.













for pi close to p∗
i.
Proof. Suppose an equilibrium where y∗
i =0a n dy∗








j + t ≤ p∗
i =a r g m a x
pi∈[0,v]
pi (v − pi)/t = v/2
(otherwise, ﬁrm i would choose a price smaller than p∗
j + t). If p∗
j <v / 2 − t,
ﬁrm j can choose a higher price and increase its proﬁt. Indeed it would keep
1More generally, the market clearing condition may have to be imposed in addition to
the Nash equilibrium conditions. See the deﬁnition of an “oligopolistic equilibrium” in
d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and G´ erard-Varet (2007).
12the whole contested segment and get closer to its monopoly price v/2o ni t s
captive segment. Hence p∗
j = v/2−t. The left-sided derivative of piDi(pi,p ∗
j)a t
pi = v/2i sc o n s e q u e n t l y−v/4t<0, so that ﬁrm i has an incentive to decrease
its price and penetrate the contested segment. Thus, y∗
i > 0f o ri =1 ,2a n dt h e
result follows from the deﬁnition of Di.
Using this lemma, we can directly derive the ﬁrst order conditions of the
program (6) with the two constraints holding as equalities, and λi,μi ≥ 0t h e











, i =1 ,2. (7)
Let us deﬁne θi = λi/(λi+μi) ∈ [0,1], the relative weight of the competitiveness
constraint, which can be interpreted2 as the competitive aggressiveness of ﬁrm







=0 ,i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.( 8 )
We thus obtain a system of two equations with the two prices (p1,p 2)a su n -




(6 + θj)(2v + t)
(5 + θi)(5+θj) − 1
, i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.( 9 )
The set of equilibria of the price-quantity game may accordingly be parame-
terized by the competitive aggressiveness (θ1,θ2)o ft h et w oﬁrms. For each
2See d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and G´ erard-Varet (2007).
13value of θ,w es h a l lc a l lθ-equilibrium the corresponding Nash equilibrium of the
price-quantity game. Of course, the equations (9) do not ensure that the two
ﬁrms are both active and together serve the whole contested segment for any
pair (θ1,θ2)i n[ 0 ,1]
2. In order to simplify the analysis for not having to restrict
the set of admissible pairs (θ1,θ2), we rather introduce a further restriction on
the parameters in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume 3/2 <v / t<14. Then, we can associate with any
θ ∈ [0,1]
2 an equilibrium ((p∗
1 (θ),D 1 (p∗ (θ))),(p∗
2 (θ),D 2 (p∗ (θ)))),w i t hp∗
i (θ)
given by (9) and Di (p) as indicated in Lemma 1. Conversely, any equilibrium
must satisfy equations (9).
Proof. Equations (9), together with the equalities qi = Di (p), i =1 ,2, ex-
press the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrst order conditions. These conditions are suﬃcient
for a global maximum, since the proﬁt to be maximized by each ﬁrm i is a quasi-
concave function of (pi,q i), and the two constraints in (6) deﬁne a convex set.
Also, as p∗
i (θ) is decreasing in both arguments, p∗
i (θ) ≤ p∗
i (0,0) = (2v + t)/4.
For the contested market to be covered when the prices are both equal to this
upper bound, we must have p∗
i (0,0)+t/2 <v , which is equivalent to 3/2 <v / t .
This condition excludes equilibria where ﬁrms are local monopolies in the con-
tested segment. Finally, it is easy to check that the diﬀerence p∗
i (θ) − p∗
j (θ)i s
maximized at θi =0a n dθj =1 ,a n dt h a tp∗
i (0,1)−p∗
j (1,0) = (2v + t)/29 <t ,
provided v/t < 14. This condition ensures that both ﬁrms are active in the
contested segment. Under the assumed parameter restriction, any equilibrium
must have both ﬁrms active in the contested segment and together serving it
14completely, so that the converse statement is also proved.















((5 + θi)(5+θj) − 1)
2. (10)
















An increase in the competitive aggressiveness of ﬁrm i is associated with a
decrease in both prices, but more signiﬁcant for price pi, hence with an increase
in the ﬁrm i share of the contested market. Consequently, the proﬁto fﬁrm j
can only decrease, whereas there are two opposite eﬀects on the proﬁto fﬁrm
i. As its competitive aggressiveness increases, the increase in its market share
eventually ceases to compensate for its price decrease.
2.4 Standard competition regimes as particular cases of
equilibrium
The set of equilibria of the price-quantity game contains the outcomes of all stan-
dard regimes of spatially diﬀerentiated duopolistic competition. Each outcome
c a nt h u sb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t has p e c i ﬁc pair of degrees of competitive aggressive-
ness.
152.4.1 The polar cases: tacit collusion and price competition
The two polar cases are characterized by the minimum and maximum values of
the parameter θi for i =1 ,2.
• If θ1 = θ2 = 0 (the competitiveness constraint is ineﬀective), both ﬁrms
charge the same price pm =( 2 v + t)/4, which is the collusive price of the
duopoly, the one that maximizes the sum of the two proﬁts: p1D1 +p2D2
under the market feasibility constraint.
• If θ1 = θ2 = 1 (only the competitiveness constraint binds), both ﬁrms
charge the same price pH =( 2 v + t)/5, which corresponds to the price
equilibrium in the Hotelling pure price competition game.
2.4.2 The Cournot solution
The Cournotian ﬁrm i chooses the quantity qi in order to maximize its proﬁt
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j . Comparing with equations (8), we see that equations









2.4.3 The Stackelberg equilibria
Take ﬁrm 1 as the leader and ﬁrm 2 as the follower. Suppose that the ﬁrms
compete in quantities, and consider the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium.
In this case, the follower behaves as a Cournotian ﬁrm solving an optimization
program in q2 (given q1), the solution of which is characterized, independently













a Stackelberg equilibrium outcome. Clearly,
it should satisfy, for ﬁrm 2, the Cournotian ﬁrst order condition (8) with θ2 =









Hence it should satisfy (8) for some θ1, and so the corresponding proﬁts h o u l db e
in the set {Π1 (θ1,2/3) | θ1 ∈ [0,1]}.S i n c eﬁrm 1 is the leader, the proﬁts h o u l d
be the highest one, namely (by (11)) Π1 (14/17,2/3). Thus, the Stackelberg
quantity equilibrium outcome is seen to coincide with an equilibrium outcome
of the price-quantity game, for θSq =( 1 4 /17,2/3).
Now suppose that the ﬁrms compete in prices. In this case, the follower faces
the sole competitiveness constraint, so that we may characterize the solution to
its optimization problem by θ2 =1 . B yas i m i l a ra r g u m e n ta sa b o v e ,t h e
Stackelberg price equilibrium outcome coincides with an equilibrium outcome
17of the price-quantity game, for θSp =( 5 /6,1).
We observe that the leader is now in the worst possible position, since the
competitive toughness of the follower is at its maximum, whereas the more
moderate competitive toughness of the leader beneﬁts more to the follower than
to himself. The proﬁt of the follower thus ends up larger than the proﬁto ft h e
leader (as well known in the context of strategic complementarity: see Gal-Or,
1985). This is in contrast with quantity competition, where the leader beneﬁts




2 ). Moreover, both proﬁts are
higher in quantity competition than in price competition (since θSq < θSp).
Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium concept can also be applied to price-
quantity strategies. In this case, the leading ﬁrm has complete control of the
follower’s environment, so that it can choose a price-quantity pair entailing the
lowest possible competitive aggressiveness of its rival, namely θ2 =0 .U s i n gt h e
same argument and referring to equation (11), we obtain that the Stackelberg
price-quantity equilibrium outcome coincides with an equilibrium outcome of
the simultaneous price-quantity game, for θSpq =( 4 /5,0).
3 Strategic choice of managerial aggressiveness
T h el e s s o nt ob ed e r i v e df r o mt h ea n a l y s i sw eh a v ej u s tm a d eo ft h eS t a c k e l b e r g
concept is that the leading ﬁrm behavior can be interpreted as the choice of
the optimal competitive aggressiveness, given the follower’s. In a context of
separation between ownership and management, the selection of the manager
18on the basis of his personality traits, experience or accepted policy orientation
is a way for the owners of setting the degree of competitiveness of their ﬁrm.
Hence, a natural further step in our analysis is to treat the θ parameters as
exogenous in the price-quantity game, and to introduce a preliminary stage
where these parameters are chosen strategically.
3.1 A reformulation of the price-quantity game
Let us consider the competitive aggressiveness parameters θ ∈ [0,1]
2 as exoge-
nously given. The modiﬁed game, which we shall call the θ-game, has the same




θipiqi +( 1− θi)pi (D(pi,p j) − qj) (15)
s.t. qi ≤ Di(pi,p j).
In such a game, the higher θi the less ﬁrm i cares about the residual demand
left by its rival, and the more it concentrates on pure price competition in order
to conquer a large market share. Hence, the parameter θi can indeed be seen as
the aggressiveness factor of ﬁrm i, actually as an attitude of the manager with
respect to his competitor. The following proposition shows that the equilibrium
of this game coincides with the equilibrium of the previous game characterized
b yt h es a m ev a l u eo fθ.
Proposition 3 For θ =( θ1,θ2) ∈ [0,1]
2,t h eθ-equilibrium of the price-quantity
game coincides with the equilibrium of the θ-game.
19Proof. Relations (8), associated with some value of θ,a r ee x a c t l yt h eﬁrst
order conditions of the program (15) of the corresponding θ-game. By the
concavity of the objective function and the linearity of the constraint, these
ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient for a global maximum.
3.2 The delegation game
Adopting a delegation point of view, we may consider each θ-game as a subgame
in a two-stage game requiring, in a ﬁrst stage, that the owners of each ﬁrm i
hire a manager with aggressiveness θi.3
The ﬁrst stage game has the owner of each ﬁrm i c h o o s i n gas t r a t e g yθi ∈
[0,1], and leads to the payoﬀs Πi (θi,θj), i =1 ,2, as deﬁned in (10). Computing











' 0.828. Thus, when competing in aggressiveness, ﬁrms are led
to a (subgame perfect) equilibrium outcome between Cournot and Hotelling,
since θC




lower than the Cournot (quantity
competition) proﬁt but higher than the Hotelling (price competition) proﬁt.
3The structure of our formulation is closely related to the Industrial Organization literature
on managerial incentives, under separation of ownership and control. This literature resorts
however to single strategic variables (either quantities or prices), and introduces other payoﬀ
functions to be maximized by managers. These functions are convex combinations of either
the ﬁrm proﬁt and revenue (Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and Sklivas, 1987) or of both ﬁrms
proﬁts (Miller and Pazgal, 2001).
203.3 The impact of environmental hostility
We have heretofore assumed uniformity of travel costs per unit of length in
the captive and contested market segments. Domestic and foreign travel con-
ditions can however diﬀer, sometimes quite sharply. More generally, if we take
an abstract view of the characteristics space, beyond its strict geographical in-
terpretation, a decrease, say, in the travel cost t ∈ (0,v) in the sole contested
market appears as a convenient way to make the two products more substi-
tutable, and hence to increase the intensity of competition, independently of
any autonomous change in competitive aggressiveness. Also, we may decrease
the size of the captive market segments relative to the contested segment, and
hence increase the degree of ﬁrms exposure to competition, by simply increasing
the travel cost t0 ∈ (v/a,∞) in the former (for simplicity, we will continue to
refer to a symmetric game). In both cases, by changing t or t0 we are simply
modifying the environment of both ﬁrms, making it more or less hostile accord-
i n gt ot h ev a r i a t i o no ft h er a t i ot/t0 we are considering, whether a decrease or
an increase, respectively.
A simple inspection of equation (4) suggests that the modiﬁed potential
demand to ﬁrm i is
Di(pi,p j)=
v − pi











It is easy to check that Lemma 1 still applies, and that we may continue to use
ﬁrst order conditions (8), leading to
p∗
i (θi,θj)=
(2 + 4t/t0 + θj)(1+2v/t0)
(1 + 4t/t0 + θi)(1+4t/t0 + θj) − 1
t, i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j. (17)
21As before, the prices are decreasing with the aggressivenesses of both competi-
tors. They are also decreasing with the environmental hostility, assessed here in
terms of the (exogenous) intensity of competition, as measured by the inverse
of the ratio t/t0. The argument in the proof of Proposition 1 can again be used







< 6+8( t/t0). (18)
Finally, from proﬁt Πi to be maximized in θi,
Πi (θi,θj)=
µ
(2 + 4t/t0 + θj)(1+2v/t0)
(1 + 4t/t0 + θi)(1+4t/t0 + θj) − 1
¶2 2t/t0 + θi
2
t, i =1 ,2, i 6= j,
(19)
and by computing the corresponding ﬁrst order condition, we derive the reaction
function of ﬁrm i in the delegation game:
θi =
4t/t0 + θj
1+4 t/t0 + θj
, i =1 ,2, i 6= j. (20)
We observe that the degrees of competitive aggressiveness are strategic comple-
ments in the delegation game. Besides, the aggressiveness of any ﬁrm decreases
with the environmental hostility, for a given level of the rival’s aggressiveness.










, i =1 ,2. (21)
The equilibrium value b θi of the aggressiveness factor is an increasing function
of the ratio t/t0 of the travel costs in the two market segments. As this ratio
22decreases, the environment of both ﬁrms becomes more hostile, triggering the
compensating eﬀect of a decrease in competitive aggressiveness.
T h ew a yt h ed e c r e a s ei nt h er a t i ot/t0 comes about (through a fall in t
or through a rise in t0) is indiﬀerent as concerns the equilibrium value of the
aggressiveness factor, although not as concerns equilibrium prices and proﬁts,
since changes in t and in t0 do not work exclusively through the ratio t/t0 in
this case. From the point of view of our discussion in this paper the signiﬁcant
point is however that in both cases the adjustment of the degree of competitive
aggressiveness to a more hostile environment moderates the proﬁt decline gen-
erated by the fall in the ratio t/t0. We illustrate this eﬀect in the two following
ﬁgures, where thick curves represent, for diﬀerent values of the ratio t/t0,t h e
equilibrium proﬁts of the delegation game, whereas thin curves represent the
equilibrium proﬁts of the pure price competition game (the one associated with
θ =( 1 ,1)).4
4We use the parameter values v = 6 and, either t0 =1a n dv a r i a b l et (in Figure 2), or t =1
and variable t0 (in Figure 3). According to (18), we must assume 0.57 <t<5.5i nt h ef o r m e r
case, and t0 < 10 in the latter.









Changes in product diﬀerentiation









Changes in the captive market size
The moderating eﬀect of the aggressiveness factor adjustment slows down the
proﬁt decline as the two products become more and more substitutable in the
contested market (Figure 3), or as captive markets shrink (Figure 4).
Thus, this eﬀect countervails the immediate inﬂuence of a more hostile en-
vironment on the competition prevailing at the second stage of the delegation
game: an increase in environment hostility (as product diﬀerentiation diminishes
24or as the captive market segments shrink) may induce a cut-throat competition
with a proﬁt squeeze for both ﬁrms, principally if the degree of competitive ag-
gressiveness is at its maximum (that is, if competition is exclusively in prices).
Anticipating such a detrimental price war leads the ﬁrms to adjust their degrees
of aggressiveness to a lower level, in contradiction to the conventional wisdom
claiming that tough guys should be drafted when the battleﬁeld is under ﬁre.
From an empirical point of view, the inﬂuence of environmental hostility
on the relationship between ﬁrm performance and competitive aggressiveness
has been extensively considered in the literature with diﬀering results (Covin
and Covin, 1990, Miles, Arnold and Thompson, 1993, Slater and Narver, 1994,
McGee and Rubach, 1996/97, Lumpkin and Dess, 2001, Papadakis & Barwise,
2002, among others). In these studies, though, the hostility of a ﬁrm environment
includes the aggressiveness of its competitors. Therefore, a positive correlation
between environmental hostility and competitive aggressiveness of a ﬁrm might
be largely due to its strategic complementarity with its rivals. One of the mes-
sages of our approach is that competitive aggressiveness is a feature of each ﬁrm
conduct, and should be separated from structural characteristics of the industry
such as the hostility of the environment (limited in our model to the degree of
product substitutability and the degree of exposure to competition). An in-
teresting relationship to investigate empirically would be that of equilibrium
competitive aggressiveness with environmental hostility as a structural feature.
254 Concluding remarks
In this paper competitive aggressiveness has been analyzed in a simple oligopolis-
tic model ` al aHotelling, where each one of two ﬁrms supplies two connected
market segments, a captive segment and a contested segment. It is argued that
the entrepreneurial orientation of each ﬁrm can be rationalized in terms of a
proﬁt maximizing objective. Two explanations are proposed. The ﬁrst simply
assumes that ﬁrms maximize proﬁt subject to a preliminary feasibility analysis
addressing both the customer side and the competitor side. The competitive
aggressiveness of each ﬁrm is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter
to characterize the set of equilibria. The second explanation treats competitive
aggressiveness as an exogenous variable under the control of each ﬁrm through
its manager hiring decision. Thus, in a preliminary stage, ﬁrms choose their
managerial aggressiveness, which is ﬁnally determined in the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game. When competition is exogenously intensiﬁed through
higher product substitutability or through increased weight of the contested
market segment, ﬁrms compensate at equilibrium for the weaker proﬁtability
induced by the more competitive environment by hiring less aggressive man-
agers. Rather hire a dove than a hawk when the wind is rising.
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